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Title VII and the Use of Sex-Based Actuarial Tables in Annuity Pension Plans: Arizona
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris'
— Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 as part of a comprehensive
national endeavor to correct racial and sexual discrimination in employment oppor-
tunities.' Title VII prohibits employers from making employment decisions based on an
individual's sex.' Under the statute, individual attributes, rather than group characteris-
tics, must be relied upon in deciding when to hire and in determining compensation and
other terms and conditions of employment. 5
 In spite of this legislation designed to
prohibit classifications which differentiate between males and females," insurance com-
panies universally use sex-based mortality tables' to determine annuity premiums and
payouts." Such reliance on group characteristics, though statistically valid" and invaluable
to the insurance industry, 10
 is contrary to the principles of Title VII."
The conflict between the insurance industry's practices and the policies underlying
Title VII is clearly evidenced by the use of annuities in employer-operated pension
plans." These plans are based on actuarial tables which show that the average woman
lives longer than the average man.'" Because of their longer life expectancy, women must
either make larger contributions to the annuity fund or receive smaller periodic benefits
from the fund than their male counterparts." The justification behind this unequal
treatment is that it permits benefits to be paid to women over their longer average life
' 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
a Id. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
2391, 2401.
The statute provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer — (I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
• "The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous." City of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
" The statute provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — . . . (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
1 A mortality table calculates life expectancy through "a series of estimates based on past
experience and adjusted for changes expected in the future as well as for needed safety margins." J.
ATHEARN, RISK AND INSURANCE 502 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ATHEARNJ.
• Note, Sex DiScrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 8.1J. L. REV. 624, 625 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Sex Discrimination].
o Note, The End of Sex Discrimination in Employer-Operated Pension Plans: The Challenge of the
Manhart Case, 1979 DUKE L.J. 682 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, The End of Sex Discrimination].
10 Note, Sex Discrimination, supra note 8, at 626.
" Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 683.
" A pension plan "is a plan established by an employer which pays predetermined benefits to
those of Isis employees who become eligible on retirement to participate. It may be self-funded or
purchased from an insurance company." Note, Sex Discrimination, supra note 8, at 628 n.23.
'a Id. at 627.
" Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 683. The underlying principle of annuities
is that "the fund from which annuitants are paid should not be exhausted until the last annuitant
covered by the fund dies." EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D. Me. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 589 F.2d 1139, 1146 (1st Cir. 1978).
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expectancy without exhausting the annuity fund.'" In 1978, in Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart,' the United States Supreme Court considered for the first
time the apparent disparate treatment of men and women under pension plans." In
Manhart, the Court held that requiring women to make monthly contributions to an
employer-operated retirement plan which were higher than those contributions made by
male employees violated Title VII because similarly situated females were treated differ-
ently than males.'s The Manhart Court did not reach the question of whether Title VII
was violated when female employees received post-retirement annuity payments which
were smaller than the payments received by men in the same program. 19 In 1983,
however, the Court, in Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 20 employed the reasoning of Manhart and held that such a
retirement plan violated Title VII." The Norris Court delegated to the employer the
responsibility of making sure that annuity plans offered by insurance companies are not
run on a sex-distinct basis. 22
Beginning in 1974, the state of Arizona offered a voluntary deferred compensation
plan to its employees which allowed them to postpone receipt of a portion of their
compensation until retirement. 23 After inviting private insurance companies to submit
bids outlining the investment opportunities they were willing to offer Arizona employees,
the state selected a number of companies to participate in the retirement plan." Several of
" Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 683. While life insurance focuses on the
needs of others, for instance, a widow and children left behind, pension and annuity plans focus on
the future needs of the insured. Note, Sex Discrimination, supra note 8, at 628. The annuity serves to
distribute the insured's money so as to last throughout his or her life. Id. at 628 n.27. An individual's
knowledge about his or her general health, lifestyle and longevity expectations bear directly on the
choice of life insurance. Id. at 628-29. "Only those who feel their prospects for long life are good are
willing to make the substantial payments necessary for retirement annuities." Id. at 629 n.31.
435 U.S. 702 (1978).
17 Id.
IS Id. at 717. In Manhart, female employees were required to contribute 14.84% more than
similarly situated male employees. Id. at 705. Thus, their take-home pay was less. Id.
12
 Nor did the Court discuss the possibility that the retirement plan was only offered by the
employer as one of several retirement plans and not operated by him. See generally Hatch, Calculating
Annuity Payinints in a Retirement Plan Based on Sex-Distinct Mortality Tables — Norris v. Arizona: Is
Manhart Controlling? 18 FORUM 539 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hatch] (where the commentator
provides a background of the annuity pension plan cases and notes the distinction between those
cases in which the employer only offered the plans and those in which the employer operated the
discriminatory plans).
20 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
21 Id. at 3501.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 3494. The deferred compensation plan was administered by the Arizona Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans. Id. Arizona's plan was
approved by the Internal Revenue Service in 1974. Id. at 3494 n. I. During the accumulation phase of
the plan, employees were "free to choose from a wide variety of investments selected by the
Governing Committee into which their deferred compensation could he directed, including savings
accounts, mutual funds, life insurance, or annuities." Petitioner's Brief at 4, Arizona v. Norris, 103 S.
Ct. 3492 (1983).
24 Id. at 3494. Employees were required to choose one of the companies selected by the state to
participate in the plan; they were not free to invest their deferred compensation in any other way. Id.
The companies chosen by Arizona included Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, National
Investors Life Insurance Company, Valley National Bank of America, Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Company, the Hartford Insurance Company, ITT Life Insurance Corp., Keystone 134 Mutual
Fund, and the Arizona State Employees Credit Union. Petitioner's Brief at 4.
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the companies selected allowed employees to elect to receive their retirement benefits in
one of three ways: 25
 a lump-sum payment, periodic payments of a fixed sum for a specific
time, or monthly annuity payments paid out over the remainder of the employee's life by
an independent insurance company." Many employees found the voluntary annuity
alternative to be the most attractive option, because the receipt of a lump sum upon
retirement required immediate payment of taxes on the entire amount, 27 and the receipt
of a fixed sum for a specified period required an employee to speculate as to how long he
or she would live." The purchase of a life annuity solved both of these problems because
it reduced an employee's tax liability by spreading the payments out over time, while at
the same time guaranteeing that the employee would receive a constant stream of
payments for life." As the employer, the state bore the costs of making the necessary
payroll deductions and was responsible for withholding the appropriate sums from the
employee's wages and channeling those sums to an insurance company designated by the
employee."
The amount of the monthly benefits for an employee who elected to receive the
retirement annuity depended on the amount of compensation deferred, the employee's
age at retirement, and the employee's sex. 3! All of the companies that underwrote the life
annuities 32
 used sex-based mortality tables to calculate monthly annuity benefits." Be-
cause women, on average, live longer than men, 34 these pension plans paid out larger
monthly payments to men than to women even if the men and women had deferred the
same amount of compensation and retired at the same age.35 By making smaller payments
to women, the companies were able to satisfy the underlying principles of annuities — to
continue distributing the insured's payments for the duration of his or her life. 36
On May 3, 1975, Nathalie Norris, an employee of the Arizona Department of
Economic Security 3 7 chose to participate in a deferred compensation plan." She elected
to invest her deferred compensation in the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company's
fixed annuity contract." A short time later, Norris filed charges with the Equal Employ-
25 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3494. Receipt of the annuity benefits is referred to as the "payout" phase.
Petitioner's Brief at 5.
" 103 S. Ct. at 3494. "At the time an employee enrolls in the plan, he may also select one of the
payout options offered by the company that he has chosen, but when he reaches retirement age he is
free to switch to one of the company's other options." Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
" Id. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting). "To achieve tax benefits under federal law, the life annuity
must be purchased by a company designated by the retirement plan." Id. Out of 681 women
participating in the deferred compensation plan 572 chose some form of annuity option. Id. at 3495.
w Id. at 3494. The state did not contribute any monies, however, to supplement the employee's
deferred wages. Id.
" Id. at 3494-95.
32 For a list of some of those companies which underwrote the life annuities, see supra note 24.
" Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495. "Sex is the only factor that the tables use to classify individuals of the
same age; the tables do not incorporate other factors correlating with longevity such as smoking
habits, alcohol consumption, weight, medical history, or family history." Id. The vast majority of
private insurers in the United States use sex-based mortality tables to calculate monthly annuity
benefits. Id. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 3495.
" Id.
" See supra notes 14- 15.
" Id.
" Id.
39 Id.
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ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission")," complaining that the plan
was not administered equally to male and female employees." She received no redress,
however, from administrative remedies." On April 25, 1978, Norris" filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Arizona Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans ("Arizona')."
The complaint alleged that the differentiation in monthly benefits received by men and
women under the state-offered annuity plan was a violation of Title VII and of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.'
The district court granted summary judgment for Norris." The court began its
analysis by holding that the employees' participation in the plan was a benefit and
privilege of employment under the Civil Rights Act, even though the participation was
voluntary." Relying extensively on the Supreme Court's decision in Manhart, the court
further held that the state's deferred compensation plan was sexually discriminatory and,
therefore, violated Title V11. 48
 The court reiterated Manhart's premise that employers
could not avoid their responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate
shells." Accordingly, because "male and female employees must be treated equally by an
employer,"80
 the court stated that pension plans based on discriminatory mortality tables
were impermissible." The district court permanently enjoined Arizona from carrying out
its obligations under the deferred compensation plan by using sex-based actuarial tables
and directed that the amount of future annuity payments to retired female employees be
equal to the sum received by similarly situated male employees 52
Arizona appealed the district court's summary judgment to the United States Court
40 The EEOC is an administrative agency responsible for ensuring compliance with Title VII. 29
C.F.R. §§ 1604.8(b) and (c) (1984). See generally Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9 (for a
good description of the EEOC's responsibilities).
`li Petitioner's Brief at 6.
42 Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans, 486 F. Supp. 645, 647 (D. Ariz. 1980), aff 'd, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), of 'd, 103 S. Ct.
3492 (1983). •
43 Plaintiff Norris filed suit on behalf of herself and the class of females now or in the future
enrolled in the deferred compensation plan. Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 647. The district court approved
this action as meeting all the requirements for certification of a class action pursuant to FED. R. CP/.
P. 23. Id. at 651.
" Norris, IOS S. Ct. at 3495.
" Petitioner's Brief at 6. The district court relied on Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), in dismissing Norris' fourteenth amendment equal protection claim.
Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 651. The court stated, "there must be a purposeful discrimination shown
before the statute or the program would be found to be offensive to the equal protection clause ....
[lit is clear that [the] classification [treating females differently than similarly situated males] was not
made by the defendants but rather are the results of the insurers' judgment."Id. at 651. Respondent
did not cross-appeal from this ruling. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495 n.4.
16
 Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 652.
" Id. at 649. The Norris district court stated that "tilt is unrealistic and illogical to accept the
proposition that because a female has the option not to participate that she is not being discriminated
against." Id.
" Id. at 652.
" Id. at 650.
s° Id. at 652.
51 a
52 Id.
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." On appeal, Arizona argued that the use of sex-based
mortality tables was vital to the insurance business" and that Title VII should not be
construed to prohibit employers from offering life annuity contracts from private insur-
ers.55 Rejecting•the state's claim that the lower court had interfered with the insurance
business, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. 56 The court
held that the district court had neither construed Title VII to supersede Arizona's laws
regulating insurance companies," nor prohibited insurance companies from using sex-
segregated annuity payments." Title VII, the appeals court stated, "governs the relation-
ship between employees and their employer, not between employees and third parties?'"
The court rejected Arizona's claim that Norris' recovery should be precluded because the
employer did not take an active role in discriminating against women." Relying on
Manhart, the court of appeals stated that Norris was not required to prove that Arizona
intended to discriminate against women to be successful in her Title VII action." The
court explained that the Supreme Court in Manhart had required no affirmative showing
of intent when it held that Title VII was violated because similarly situated females were
treated differently than males in an employer-operated retirement plan." Instead, the
court continued, Manhart had focused on whether Title VII prohibited the disparate
treatment under the pension fund." According to the court of appeals, the state of
Arizona specifically adopted the discriminatory plan as one of the options available to its
employees, and, therefore, the state violated Title VII."
Arizona then filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, 65
which the Court granted." In a five-to-four decision," the Court affirmed the court of
53 Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans, 671 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1982); of 'd, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
" 671 F.2d at 333.
55 Id.
56 Id.
" Id.
59 Id, The appeals court commented on the district court's opinion: "All the court has done is tell
the employer that it may not offer a fringe benefit which treats an individual woman differently than
an individual man. As Manhart noted, Title VII says nothing about the situation in which a woman
takes her money and chooses to purchase an annuity plan using sex-based tables." Id.
59 Id. (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718 n.33).
" Id. at 334. The Court held that this "control" aspect of the pension plan was "illusory."Id. The
Court stated: "[The] adoption of the plan constitutes active participation without which the chal-
lenged program could not operate." Id.
" Id. at 333. Arizona argued that "it did not intend to discriminate because it offered the plan in
spite of, not because of, the actuarial difference for women." Id.
" Id. The court of appeals also relied on Krause v. Sacramento Inn, 479 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.
1973), and Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs. Inc.. 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972), to dismiss the
alleged intent requirement. Id. at 334. The appeals court said, "this circuit has held that facially
discriminatory practices are intentional discrimination for the purposes of Title VII regardless of the
subjective motivation." Id.
93 Id. at 333.
" Id. at 335. The court rejected Arizona's argument that the plan fell within Manhart's open-
market exception because the limits existing in the marketplace and the availability of nondis-
criminatory options did not justify Arizona's affirmative action in offering the discriminatory plan.
Id. The appeals court also found the district court award of retroactive relief to be proper as
authorized by Manhart. Id. at 336. The court stated that Manhart "allowed recovery in substantially
similar circumstances." Id.
6' 103 S. Ct. 3493 (1983).
Id.
° Id. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court as to the substantive question of a Title
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appeals' decision, holding that the Arizona deferred compensation plan constituted
discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII." The Court held that since the
state was ultimately responsible for privileges of employment provided to employees, its
adoption of an annuity scheme that discriminated on the basis of sex was illegal."
The significance of Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris lies in the Supreme Court's application of the standard it
articulated in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart to optional annuity
pension plans and in its apparent challenge to basic, standardized principles of the
independent insurance industry. The majority decision upheld Norris' argument that the
differential in monthly payments constituted illegal discrimination by her employer, even
though the payments were made by independent insurance carriers and not the state. 7°
From the majority opinion it follows that the real wrong committed in Norris was the use
of allegedly discriminatory actuarial tables. It is submitted that the employer was held
responsible because Title VII only applies to the relationship between employer and
employee and, more importantly, because the employer offered the option of annuity
benefits. But the Norris decision is really an attack on the insurance industry practice of
using sex-based mortality tables which, though statistically sound, treat similarly situated
men and women differently. Because Title VII did not reach independent insurers, the
Supreme Court did not consider whether a woman purchasing her own annuities in the
open market, subject to the same sex-distinct tables, was the victim of unlawful discrimina-
tion. The Norris majority used Title VII to imply that the real wrongdoers were the
insurance companies and that changes in their mortality tables were imperative to the
preservation of a "sex-neutral" society.
This casenote will consider the Supreme Court's decision in Norris in the context of
lower federal court pension plan decisions which preceded Norris and the goals of Title
VII. The first section of the casenote will discuss the background of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and the purposes behind this legislation." The Supreme Court's decision in
Manhart, the first case to evaluate the validity of a pension plan using as a standard the
Title VII emphasis on the individual, will be examined. 72 Other federal court cases
dealing with this conflict will also be surveyed." Next, the second section of the casenote
will examine the Supreme Court's opinion in Norris.' The third part of the casenote will
then discuss the Supreme Court's analysis in Norris by considering three major weaknesses
in the Court's opinion which caused it to apply Manhart, a limited decision, to the facts of
Norris.' First, the analysis will examine Arizona's lack of control over the independent
insurers who administered the annuity plans and made use of sex-based actuarial tables.Th
VII violation in which Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens joined and justice O'Connor concurred.
Id. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist joined. Id. As to the issue of remedy, Justice O'Connor concurred with Chief justice
Burger and Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, to form a plurality denying retroactive relief.
Id.
" Id. at 3501-02. The Supreme Court rejected respondent's request for retroactive relief and
granted prospective relief only. Id. at 3509-10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
131' Id.
7° Id. at 3501.
" See infra text accompanying notes 85-94,
72 See infra text accompanying notes 95-111.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 112-57.
" See infra text accompanying notes 158-275.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 276-377.
" See infra text accompanying notes 285-328.
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It will be submitted that the Court was in error in implying an agency relationship
between the employer and the insurance companies to hold the employer responsible
under Title VII. 77 In addition, this analysis will discuss Arizona's inability to affect
conditions in the marketplace for insurance policies." This section of the casenote will
assert that the Norris pension plan falls squarely within the "open-market" exception
created in Manhart, which lawfully permitted employees to purchase the largest benefit
their pension contributions could command on the open market, and should, therefore,
have precluded respondent Norris' recovery." The second part of the casenote analysis
will demonstrate that the Norris Court was wrong to disregard Arizona's contention that
the freedom of choice the state offered in its pension plan should have been a critical
factor in determining the state's liability." It is submitted that the Court dismissed that
contention in an inapplicable footnote and inappropriately relied on Manhart, where the
employer had much more control over the employees' choice of a pension plan than the
Norris employer." The third part of the analysis section will contend that the Norris Court
erred in relying on Manhart by not requiring Title VII plaintiffs to prove discriminatory
intent," because proof of discriminatory motive is critical in Title VII actions." Finally,
the discussion shows that the effect of the Supreme Court's opinion in Norris is to suggest
a complete restructuring of insurance industry practices. Since the Court used Title VII
as a crutch to hold an employer liable for discriminatory practices of private insurance
companies, it is submitted that the Court's analysis implies that sex-based annuity plans
are, by themselves, illegal."
I. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE VII CHALLENGES TO PENSION PLANS
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to do away with employment practices which have disad-
vantaged both minorities and women." One exception to this legislation, the Bennett
Amendment," provides that a compensation differential based on sex is lawful under
Title VII if it is authorized by the Equal Pay Act." The Equal Pay Act, which requires
equal pay to men and women for equal work, permits a wage differential in four excepted
instances." The fourth exception authorizes the employer to establish a procedure for
" See infra text accompanying notes 289-306.
T"' See infra text accompanying notes 307-28.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 324-28.
" See infra text accompanying notes 329-50.
" See infra text accompanying notes 329-50.
" See infra text accompanying notes 351-77.
" See infra text accompanying notes 351-77.
84 See infra text following note 377.
83 Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 684.
" The Bennett Amendment provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation
is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29 (The Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
87 29 U.S.C.	 206(d)(1) (1982).
88 Id. The Equal Pay Act provides in pertinent part:
No employer	 shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying
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unequal pay if the differential in wages is based "on any other factor other than sex.""
A number of judicial decisions have considered whether the use of sex-based an-
nuities in employer-operated pension plans violates Title VII.'" The issue in pension plan
cases is whether sex-based actuarial tables are factors "other than sex" for the purpose of
the Equal Pay Act and, therefore, nondiscriminatory under Title VII." Defendant-
employers have argued that longevity is a factor based on sound statistical evidence of the
relative life expectancies of men and women and takes into account not only sex but other
social factors." Plaintiff-employees, however, have contended that when an employer
offers a pension plan incorporating sex-based mortality tables, the language of Title VII,
which focuses on the individual employee," is undermined."'
The Supreme Court first considered the conflict between Title VII's attention to the
individual and the insurance industry's practice of grouping by sex in City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart." In Manhart, female employees attacked the
city's pension plan requirement that females contribute more money during their em-
ployment than their male counterparts to receive equal periodic benefits upon retire-
ment." The Court held that those larger contributions could no longer be required."
Although the Court recognized that the classification at issue was based on an accurate
generalization that women, as a class, do live longer than men," and thereby draw annuity
benefits for longer periods, the Court noted that Title VI I's "focus on the individual is
unambiguous.' According to the Court, the statute precludes treatment of employees as
mere members of a sexual class.'" The Court stated that the pension plan, by requiring
wages ...at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex ... for equal work ... except where such payment is made pursuant to (1) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex ... .
Id.
69 Id. One example where the Supreme Court permitted a compensation differential due to a
"factor other than sex" was in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert, the
Supreme Court held that pregnancy was a physical condition that constituted a factor other than sex
for the purposes of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 145. Hence, the non-inclusion of
pregnancy in the employee's disability plan was nondiscriminatory. Id. at 145-46.
See also Geldulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (no sex discrimination where employer offered a
disability benefits plan which excluded pregnancy as a disability under the equal protection clause).
Id. For a good discussion of the Gilbert decision as distinguished from Manhart, see Note, The End of
Sex Discrimination, supra note 9.
" See infra text accompanying notes 95-157.
" Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 684-85.
92
 See, e.g., Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712.
" Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. It is unlawful under
Title VII "to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)(emphasis added).
" Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 683.
" 435 U.S. at 710. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court. Id. at 704. He was joined by
Justices Powell, Stewart, and White. Id. at 703. Justice Blackmun concurred in a separate opinion. Id.
at 723. Justice Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part in a separate opinion. Id. at 728.
Chief Justice Burger also concurred in part and dissented in part in an opinion joined by Justice
Rehnquist. Id. at 725. Justice Brennan did not participate in the Court's decision. Id. at 723.
96
 Id. at 706.
97 Id. at 711.
98 Id. at 707.
99
 Id. at 708.
100 Id.
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women to make higher payments, had precisely that effect.'" In addition, the Court
found that the actuarial distinctions used by the city were based entirely on sex and,
therefore, did not qualify under the fourth exception to the Equal Pay Act.'° 2 The
Manhart Court concluded that a sex-based classification deprived women of compensation
and, therefore, violated Title VII. 103
The Manhart Court expressly limited its holding in two ways. First, the Court stated
that all that was at issue in the matter before it was whether "a requirement that men and
women make unequal contributions to an employer-operated pension fund" was permis-
sible. 1°' While holding that this requirement violated Title VII, the Court qualified its
holding by emphasizing that it was not suggesting that Title VII was "intended to
revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." 103
 An additional limit on the Su-
preme Court's holding in Manhart was the "open-market exception" articulated by the
Court in that case.'" Under Title VII, the Court stated, an employer could lawfully set
aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and, following an employee's
retirement, allow each retiree to "purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumu-
lated contributions could command in the open market." 107
 The Manhart Court did not
expand on this open-market limitation by defining either the benefit that could be
purchased by an employee or the contributions that would be set aside for each employee
by the employer. In a footnote, however, the Court did reaffirm that Title VII applies
only to the employer-employee relationship.'" The Court suggested, therefore, that
under its open-market exception, if an employee uses the pension benefits set aside by his
or her employer to deal directly with a third-party insurer and purchase the best policy
available on the open market, no Title VII problem arises.'"
101 Id.
107 Id. at 712-13. The Court stated: "The record contains no evidence that any factor other than
the employee's sex was taken into account in calculating the 14.84% differential between the
respective contribution by men and women . . . 'Sex is exactly what it is based on."' Id. at 713-14
(quoting Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581, 588 (9th
Cir. 1976)).
The Manhart Court rejected petitioner's argument that Senator Humphrey's comments on the
Bennett Amendment during the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly allowed differences
in the treatment of men and women in retirement options. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 713-14. Although
the Court accepted the premise that Senator Humphrey "apparently assumed that the 1964 Act
would have little, if any, impact on pension plans," Id. at 714, the Manhart majority stated that his
"isolated comment on the Senate floor cannot change the effect of the plain language of the statute
itself." Id.
103 Id. at 711.
1O4 Id. at 717.
1 °5 Id. The Manhart decision has been construed to include only employer-operated plans with
unequal contribution requirements as violative of Title VII. Hatch, supra note 19, at 542-43. "It is
hardly possible to make a limitation any clearer. The decision means no more than that the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to forbid employee contribution schedules in
employer-operated defined benefit plans that produce unequal take-home pay for similarly situated
males and females." Id. In Peters v. Wayne State University, 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983), the Sixth Circuit held that unequal receipt of payments spread over
time or non-employer controlled pension plans do not violate the statute under Manhart. 691 F.2d at
240-41.
See Man/tart, 435 U.S. at 717-18.
107 Id. at 717-18.
108
 Id. at 718 n.33.
") Id. The Court asserted, however, that an employer cannot avoid his responsibilities by
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In denying retroactive relief to the plaintiffs in Manhart, the Court noted that since
the case at bar was the first litigation challenging pension fund contribution differences
based on valid actuarial tables, administrators of the program could have reasonably
assumed that the tables justified the differentiation."° Unless plainly commanded by
legislative action, said the Court, the "drastic changes" that its decision could have on
pension funds was enough to preclude retroactive recovery. "
A majority of the federal courts considering attacks on pension plans subsequent to
Manhart have given a broad application to the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case."2
These courts did not view the Manhart Court's express language, restricting its holding
only to the case of unequal contributions to an employer-operated pension fund, or the
unsettled open-market exception articulated in that case, as limiting." 3 Instead, these
courts interpreted the Manhart decision as implying a strict requirement of equal periodic
benefits for employees in a "defined-contribution" plan as well as equal contributions in a
"defined-benefit" pian.114 The lower courts have interpreted Manhart as prohibiting
sexual classification for all employment purposes under Title VII so that the extent of an
employer's control over the administration of the pension plans has no bearing on the
employer's responsibility of treating employees fairly and equally." 3
The first federal court decision after Manhart to consider the duties of an employer
under Title VII was the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in EEOC v. Colby College ."s There,
Colby College, a private employer, made equal contributions for its employees"? to an
delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells. Id. Other commentators have disagreed with
the "open-market exception" interpretation that an employee may use his set-aside contributions to
purchase sex-based annuities. Instead, commentators have stated the the Manhart Court adopted the
EEOC position that sex-based mortality tables are "highly suspect" and "do not predict the length of
any individual's life." Sher, Sex Discrimination in Retirement Programs, 16 FORUM 1174, 1179 (1981)
(citing EEOC Decision No. 74-118). The EEOC position echoes the contrast between the Title VII
emphasis on the individual and the group classifications inherent in the insurance system. The
argument is that the tension is resolved in Manhart in favor of the focus on the individual but that the
Court goes even further by condemning the entire actuarial system's use of sex-distinct standards.
See, Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 683. Yet, a strong argument can be made that
actuarial tables are risk-spreading devices that arise from an "economic recognition that it costs
insurers more to accept that risk for females than it does for males." Hatch, supra note 19, at 545
(emphasis in original).
n" 435 U.S. at 720.
"I Id. at 721.
"2 See infra text accompanying notes 113-45.
11 " See infra text accompanying notes 129-33 and 141-43. See, e.g., EEOC v. Colby College, 589
F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978). There, the Court rejected the defendant-employer's contention that
Manhart's language limited its holding to defined-benefit, employer-operated pension funds. Id. at
1145.
'" See infra notes 1 i5-43 and accompanying text.
l" Commentators have also interpreted Manhart as condemning both defined-benefit plans
(women make higher contributions than men but periodic post-retirement benefits are equal) as well
as defined-contribution plans (equal contributions but men receive higher periodic benefits). See, e.g.,
Note, The End of Sex Discrimination, supra note 9, at 703; Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discrimination in
Pensions: Manhart's Holding v. Manhart's Dictum, 78 CoLum, L. Ray. 1241, 1242 (1978). Because the
Manhart Court "characterized both 'pension benefits, and the contributions that maintain them,' as
compensation under Title VII ... Title VI l's condemnation of sex discrimination in an individual's
compensation seems clearly to condemn disparate benefits." Bernstein & Williams at 1242, citing
Manhart 435 U.S. at 712 n.23.
EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978).
"7 EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631, 633 (D. Me. 1977), rev'd, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir.
1978).
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independent third party insurer."" Employee participation in the college's contributory
pension plan with the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association ("TIAA")" 9 was manda-
tory.'" The insurer issued individual annuity contracts in different amounts for men than
for women directly to each employee.'" The Commission brought a Title VII suit against
the college, alleging that the pension plan Colby College used was unlawful because
women faculty members were discriminated against when they received lower annuity
payments following their retirement.'" Holding that annuity plans utilizing statistically
valid life expectancy tables are "factors other than sex" pursuant to the Equal Pay Act,
which permits a differential in wages in that excepted instance,'" the District Court for
the Southern District of Maine granted summary judgment for defendant Colby Col-
lege. 72 ` According to the court, since all similarly situated participants in the Colby College
program paid an equal percentage of their salaries into the annuity fund, unlike the
plaintiff-employees in Manhart, and Colby's contribution was identical for each employee,
all employees received coverage having the same actuarial value.'" The court asserted
that Manhart was distinguishable both factually and as a matter of law from the Colby
College situation, and the reasoning in that case was inapplicable."' The Commission
appealed the district court's finding to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.'" In
reversing the district court's judgment, the circuit court held that Colby College had
violated Title VII and could not be relieved of responsibility for TIAA's discriminatory
program because the college required employee participation in the plan.'" Further, the
court rejected the lower court's assertion that the issues in Manhart were distinct from
those in the Colby College case and instead found that the situations were comparable. 129
The court repeated Manhart's statement that the focus of Title VII is on the individual' 3o
and stated that the thrust of Manhart envisaged a single, unisex rate that would pay for
annuities for both men and women employees."' ,In applying the Manhart reasoning to
the pension plan under attack in Colby College, the court rejected the view that statistically
valid sex-based actuarial tables are "factors other than sex" which should relieve Colby of
liability, because no evidence was presented, according to the court, that any factor other
" 8 439 F. Supp. at 633. The private insurers were the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association ("TIAA") and the College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF"). Id. Those corporations
provide insurance and retirement plans for faculty and staff employed by institutions of higher
education. Peters, 476 F. Supp. 1346.
Colby College, 589 F.2d at 1141. TlAA/CREF, as well as Colby College, were named as
defendants in the suit. Id.
' 2" Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
122 Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631, 636-37 (1977).
124 Id. The district court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in determining that the Equal Pay Act must take precedence over the
Commission's conflicting interpretation of Title VII because of the Bennett Amendment. See supra
notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
123 439 F. Supp. at 634.
126
 Id. at 638.
L" Colby College, 589 F.2d at 1192.
128 Id. at 1144.
129 Id.
'3° Id.
13) Id. at 1145.
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than employee's sex was taken into account in calculating the differentials in benefits. 132
The Colby College court also noted, however, that it foresaw difficulties not addressed in
Manhart because of the Court's caveat that Title VII was not intended to revolutionize the
insurance industry. 133
 Although the circuit court interpreted the Manhart opinion as
advocating unisex rates in all instances, the court concluded that it could not understand
how this parity could be achieved without revolutionizing the insurance industry. 134
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Coffin recognized that Manhart might not
prohibit every employer-offered benefit plan from using sex-based tables.' 35 For example,
he suggested that, if a set of employee options or other features were offered along with
an annuity, the plan might legally permit unequal, yet actuarially sound, pension benefits
to be offered to participating men and women. 136
 judge Coffin stated that Manhart should
not be read restrictively, because such an approach would "foreclose creative approaches
to the problem." 137
A number of other lower courts have also held pension retirement plans with
unequal benefits for men and women to be violative of Title VII. These plans, however,
like the plan struck down in Colby College, were restrictive because they offered only one
option to the employees.' 38
 For example, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York in spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America,' 28
stated that Long Island University's ("LIU") adoption of the TIAA plan in which all
employees were required to participate, constituted affirmative participation in the sex-
based actuarial tables without which "the challenged program could not operate." 41 0 On
appeal, the Second Circuit held that as an employer, LIU had violated Title VII by
offering TIAA's annuity plans to its employees.'' The court maintained that "no mean-
" Id. at 1143.
133 Id. at 1144.
134 Id .
135 Id. at 1146 (Coffin, GI, concurring).
136 Id. Chief Judge Coffin stated: "Perhaps ... once they turn their attention to the problem, the
parties could work out a system permissible under Manhart that would eliminate the chit-like nature
of the contributions through a set of genuine employee options or other features." Id. (Coffin, C.J.,
concurring).
tar Id. (Coffin, C.J., concurring).
138
 Similarly, participation in retirement plans was mandatory in several other pension plan
cases following Manhart. E.g., Women in City Government United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp.
295, 297 (S.D.N.y. 1981); Hannahs v. Teachers Retirement System, 26 FEP Cases 527, 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Henderson v. State of Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D. Ore. 1975).
416 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded,
103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983).
146 Id. at 1022.
"' Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, 691 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir. 1982),
vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983).
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Spirt decision "in light or the Norris decision.
103 S. Ct. at 3565. On remand, the Second Circuit reinstated the operative terms of its 1982 decision
and noted that "there does not appear to be any reconsideration of liability issues required by Norris."
Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, 735 F.2d 23, 25 (1984) (citing Brief of
TIAA-CREF at 4 n.*). Upon reconsideration of the retroactivity issue, however, the Second Circuit
held that retroactive relief would be granted to the plaintiffs in Spirt, regardless of the Norris holding
that retroactive relief was an inappropriate remedy. 735 F.2d at 27. See infra text accompanying
notes 219.24 and 271-75 for a discussion of the Norris Court's denial of retroactive relief.
The Spirt court, on remand, distinguished the Norris ruling against retroactivity, which the
Second Circuit interpreted as premised upon the unfair burden placed on employers to pay out
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ingful distinction" existed between the disparate treatment accorded the female employ-
ees in Manhart, who contributed larger percentages of their salaries for the same amount
of benefits, and the treatment given to Spirt female employees, who derived unequal
benefits following retirement. 142
 According to the court, LIU significantly affected the
access of its employees to sex-neutral annuity plans by requiring participation in a
sex-distinct annuity plan, and LIU was, therefore, liable for a Title VII violation. 143
The circuits have split as to whether a private insurer is deemed an employer and
therefore violates Title VII when an employer is held liable for discriminatory employ-
ment practices under the statute. The Second Circuit in spirt held that insurers Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association and College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF') were
"so closely intertwined" with LI U that they had to be deemed employers for the purposes
of Title VII.'44
 According to the court, the employer was liable for TIAA/CREF's prac-
tices because, in effect, those insurers existed solely to enable universities to delegate their
responsibility of providing retirement benefits for their employees."' In 1982, however,
the Sixth Circuit, in Peters v. Wayne State University,' held that the employer, Wayne State,
was not liable for TIAA because the university exercised no control over the plan's
administration.' 47
 According to the court, the insurer, therefore, could not be considered
an employer subject to the provisions of Title VII.' 48
 Moreover, the Peters court held that
Wayne State did not violate Title VII when, to compensate for women's longevity, female
extra sums of money to equalize women's benefits, from the type of plan offered by the TIAA-CREF
insurers. 735 F.2d at 26-27. According to the Spirt court, Arizona's plan "provided sufficient certainty
concerning the amount of annuity payments to enable the District Court to calculate, long before the
plaintiff's retirement, the amount of her monthly annuity, [and it was this] expectation of a
determinable benefit that the Supreme Court majority in Norris did not wish to have jeopardized by
imposing added financial burdens on the plan." Id. By contrast, stated the Second Circuit, the plans
offered by TIAA-CREF challenged by the Spirt plaintiffs "do not guarantee retirees 'a certain stream
of income —
 and the benefits are not ascertainable. Id. at 27. Therefore, according to the Spirt court
on remand, the employer or TIAA-CREF Would not be burdened with additional financial obliga-
tions if a retroactive remedy were granted. Id. Consequently, the Second Circuit reinstated its earlier
decision on the merits and granted a modified form of retroactive relief to the Spirt plaintiffs. Id. at
29.
145 691 F.2d at 1061.
1 " Id. at 1063.
'" 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982).
145 Id.
'" 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983).
The Peters decision, like the Spirt decision, was vacated and remanded to the circuit court "in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Norris. 103 S. Ct. at 3566. Unlike the Second Circuit,
however, (see supra note 141) the Sixth Circuit has not yet reconsidered its earlier decision. The Peters
decision was the only discriminatory retirement plan challenge where a court held for the
defendant-employer. 691 F.2d at 238. The Sixth Circuit's decision focused heavily, however, on the
absence of the employer's control over TIAA's annuity plan, which the Supreme Court in Norris, as
this casenote contends, overlooked as a crucial factor in determining liability. See infra text accom-
panying notes 289-328.
Presumably, the Second Circuit's reconsideration of the retroactivity issue may be applicable to
the Peters case since TIAA was the insurance company which offered the annuities in both cases. But
because the employer-employee issue was insufficiently addressed in the Norris decision, this casenote
contends that the Sixth Circuit's original ruling that Wayne State had no control over the insurers
and was therefore not liable for the allegedly discriminatory annuity plan should be upheld upon
remand.
i" Id. at 238.
1 " Id.
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employees received smaller monthly payments following retirement than their male
counterparts under the Teachers Annuity Retirement plan.'" In Peters, the university
employees were not required to participate in the retirement plan.'" The Sixth Circuit
stated that the actuarial value of the annuities provided by the private insurer was equal
for similarly situated men and women.'51
 According to the court, the compensation
received by women, even though calculated through different disbursement rates, was
equal in value to benefits received by male employees.'" The court also found no
evidence of intent by the university to discriminate and no evidence of a disparate impact
upon the plaintiff class.' 53
 Consequently, the court ruled that employer Wayne State was
not subject to Title VII liability. 754
Thus, prior to the Norris decision, the majority of lower federal courts had extended
the Manhart analysis to a variety of pension plan cases, which included both defined-
contribution and defined-benefit plans.'" In most cases, the Manhart reasoning was
applied to hold that employers violate Title VII even when they have minimal control
over the use of actuarial tables by insurance companies.'" Significantly, however, most of
the decisions involved plans where the employees' options were quite restrictive.' 57 The
pension plan at issue in Norris provided greater freedom of choice to the plaintiff-
employees than had other litigated pension cases and, therefore, presented the first major
application for the open-market exception articulated in Manhart.
II. THE REASONING OF NORRIS
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that
an employer's offer of an option to receive retirement benefits from one of several
companies which pay women a lower monthly retirement benefit than men who had
made the same contribution under a plan constitutes sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII.'" The majority opinion, written by Justice Marshall,'" was divided into three
149
 Id. at 240-41.
"(1
 Id. at 237.
151 Id. at 241. The Sixth Circuit overruled the earlier district court holding, Peters v. Wayne
State University, 476 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (E.D. Mich. 1979), asserting that the district court holding
had erroneously "relied solely on the holdings and dicta of Manhart." Peters, 691 F.2d at 239 (emphasis
in original).
"1 Id.
' 53
 Id. at 239.
154
 Id. For claims of employment discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must show either
"disparate treatment" or "disparate impact." Id. at 238. The Wayne State plaintiff failed to show that
the employer's practices "otherwise unexplained, [were] more likely than not" impermissibly moti-
vated. /d. at 239. Consequently, no disparate treatment was proven./d. Disparate impact occurs when
an employer's facially neutral policy burdens one class more than another. Id. To defend against this
claim, employers must show that the practice is necessary and closely related to its business purpose.
Id. at 239-40. The appellate court found no evidence of either disparate treatment or a disparate
impact on women participating in the Wayne State policy. Id. at 239. "[T]here is no evidence that
Wayne State treats women less favorably than men because of their sex." Id. (emphasis in original).
'w See supra notes 1 12-43 and accompanying text.
155
 See supra notes 112-43 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
"8
 103 S. Ct. at 3493. The Court also held that retroactive relief was not appropriate upon
finding that Arizona's voluntary pension plan violated Title VII; rather, liability would be prospec-
tive only. Id.
'" Id.
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areas of analysis: first, whether the plan at issue would violate Title VII if run entirely by
the petitioner-employer;'" second, whether the plan was beyond the reach of Title VII
because the insurance companies actually calculated and paid the retirement benefits; 16 '
and third, whether retroactive relief to compensate for past violations of Title VII was
appropriate.' 62
The Norris Court began its analysis of the essential validity of the plan by stating that
the deferred compensation was a benefit of employment, and, therefore, was directly
within the scope of Title VII. 163
 The Court then reiterated both of Manhart's basic
premises.'64 First, the Court stated that Title VII's "focus on the individual is unambigu-
ous."'" Second, the Court declared that longevity was not a "factor other than sex" under
the Equal Pay Act.'" Relying on language in Manhart, the Norris Court explained that a
plan discriminates "because of sex" when a woman is treated "in a manner which but for
[her] sex would [have been] different." 167 Adopting the position of the majority of the
lower courts, the Court stated that a classification of employees on the basis of sex is no
more permissible at the payout stage of a retirement plan than it is at the contribution
stage.'" The Norris Court likened the Arizona defined-contribution plan to the defined-
benefit plan struck down in Manhart because Arizona's plan would require a woman to
make greater monthly contributions than a man if she wished to receive equal monthly
benefits following retirement. 166 The Court recognized that the plan in Manhart also
required greater contributions from females than it did from males.'" In a footnote, the
Court stated that it was irrelevant that Arizona employees were not required to participate
in the pension plan because Title VII forbids all discrimination concerning conditions of
employment, not just discrimination concerning aspects of the employment relationship
as to which the employee has no choice.'" According to the Court, it was irrelevant that
the Arizona plan included two other options for payout benefits provided on equal terms
to men and women.'" The Court stated that an employer who offers one fringe benefit
on a discriminatory basis cannot escape liability because it also offers other benefits on a
nondiscriminatory basis.'"
Dismissing Arizona's contention that its plan was nondiscriminatory, the Norris Court
ruled that the male and female employees' annuity policies were of roughly equal
actuarial value. 174 According to the Court, the petitioners "incorrectly assume[d]"'" that
160 Id. at 3496.
161 Id. at 3499.
1" Id. at 3502.
'" Id. at 3496. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment against any individual regard-
ing "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
sex . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
164 103 S. Ct. at 3496 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
166 Id.
16' Id. (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712-13).
187 Id. at 3496-97 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711).
1"8 Id. at 3497.
169 Id.
170 Id.
71 Id. at 3497 n.10.
"2 Id.
17' Id. (citing Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 n.8 (1982)).
174 Id. at 3497.
175 Id.
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Title VII permits a classification of employees on the basis of sex in predicting their
longevity.'" This premise, the Court found, is totally inconsistent with the Manhart
Court's basic tenet that Title VII requires employers to treat their employees as individ-
uals, and not simply as constituents of a sexual class.'" In support of this finding, the
Court restated dicta appearing in the Manhart decision that " `[e]ven a true generalization
about [a] class' cannot justify class-based treatment." 178 Discriminatory impact, the Court
stated, occurs even if the class of which an individual is a member has not been treated
unfairly as a result of the disproportionate standard.'" Consequently, the Court ex-
plained that an individual female employee may not be paid lower monthly benefits
simply because the class to which she belongs lives longer than the class consisting of
men.'" Manhart, the Court stated, made clear that requiring female employees to make
higher contributions than males in defined-benefit plans is impermissible under Title
VII.' 8 ' The Norris Court reasoned that discriminatory defined-contribution plans" 2
should also be struck down" and concluded in its first section of analysis that Arizona
plainly would have violated Title VII had it operated the deferred compensation plan
itself.'"
Turning to the second part of its analysis, the Court considered whether Title VII
applied to a retirement plan structured like the plan Arizona had made available to its
employees. The majority began by examining the extent of the state's liability.'" The
Court recognized that although Arizona offered the option of annuities to its employees,
the insurance companies actually calculated and disbursed the annuity plans.'" Despite
this fact, the Court determined that the state had still discriminated against its female
employees and had violated Title VII,'" relying on its statement in Manhart that Title VII
"primarily govern[s] relations between employees and their employer, not between em-
ployees and third parties."'" In a footnote, the Court emphasized that Title VII applies to
"6 Id.
177 Id. at 3498 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708). The Norris Court stated "Manhart squarely
rejected the notion that, because women as a class live longer than men, an employer may adopt a
retirement plan that treats every individual woman less favorably than every individual man." Id.
178 Id. (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708). In a footnote, the Court responded to Justice
Blackmun's doubt that Manhart could be reconciled with the decision in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Id. at 3498 n.14. There, the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's
disability benefit plan did not constitute discrimination "because of . . . sex" within the meaning of
Title VII [because] the special treatment of pregnancy distinguished not between men and women,
but between pregnant women and non-pregnant persons . . . ." Id. See supra note 89. The dissent in
Gilbert asserted that pregnancy was strongly "sex-related." 429 U.S. at 149. This tension between the
two cases was resolved, the Norris Court stated, by the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, in which Congress overruled Gilbert by amending Title VII to establish that the terms "because
of sex" included pregnancy. The Norris Court asserted that Congress' decision to forbid special
treatment of pregnancy provided further support for the Manhart conclusion that "the greater costs
of providing retirement benefits for female employees does not justify the use of a sex-based
retirement plan." Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3499 n.14.
17" Id. at 3498.
"° Id. at 3498-99.
181 See supra note 105.
182 See supra note 105.
1 " Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3499.
184 Id.
1 "' Id.
188 id.
1 " Id. at 3501.
1 " Id. at 3499 (citing Matt/vet, 435 U.S. at 718 n.33).
104	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 26:63
discrimination committed by both employers and "any agent" of an employer.' 89 The
Court then restated Manhart's open-market exception, which made it lawful under Title
VII for an employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and
allow each retiree to purchase the largest benefits available in the open market. 19° Consid-
ering the petitioner's contention that it had not violated Title VII because its plan
reflected what was available in the open market, 191
 the Court held that it was no defense
that all annuities available in the open market were based on sex-based mortality tables.' 92
Whether any other insurers offered sex-neutral annuities was irrelevant, the Court stated,
since Arizona did not simply set aside retirement contributions and let employees pur-
chase annuities on the open market. 193 Instead, the Court emphasized that Arizona had
actively provided the opportunity to obtain an annuity as part of its own deferred
compensation plan.'" According to the Court, the state's provision of that option, its
invitation to insurance companies to submit bids outlining their plans, and its selection of
those companies who would participate in the plan was enough affirmative action by the
state to justify a finding of a Title VII violation: 199
 Specifically, the Court recognized that
each of these actions involved a contract between the state and the companies governing
the terms on which benefits were to be provided to employees. 1 • These contracts, the
Court determined, restricted the number of companies among which the employees
could choose to make an annuity contract: 197
 In effect, the Court stated, the state's
decision to enter into contracts with a limited number of insurance companies prevented
a true "open-market."'"
In a lengthy footnote, the Court rejected Arizona's argument that the lump-sum
payment option open to all employees enabled them to purchase the largest benefit his or
her accumulated contributions could command in the open market. 199 This option for
open-market purchase, the state contended, should have allowed it to escape Title VII
liability: 2" The Court rejected this argument by restating its premise that even when
another fringe benefit is provided on a nondiscriminatory basis, an employer still violates
Title VII by offering any option that discriminates."' In the same footnote, the Court
reluctantly addressed the contention that Arizona's conduct was exempted from the reach
of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson Act (the "Act"). 202 That statute prohibits any
congressional act from invalidating, impairing, or superseding any law enacted to regu-
late the business of insurance, unless the law specifically relates to insurance."9 The Norris
1N9	 at 3499 n.16.
' 9°. Id. at 3499.
191 Id.
 at 3499-3500.
192 Id. at 3500.
193 Id .
 at 3501.
' 94
 Id.
192 Id.
'" Id.
Id.
Id.
199 id .
 at 3500 n.17.
2" Id.
"' Id.
2"2 The Norris Court did not want to discuss the McCarran- Ferguson Act's reach, 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-1015 (1982), because the state had made no mention of it in its brief. Id. Because the majority
viewed the dissenting opinion in Norris as relying on the McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, the
Court did address the issue. Id.
209 Id.
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Court rejected the state's contention that Title VII was unlawfully interfering with the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 204 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the court of
appeals' explanation that, because the plaintiffs did not challenge the conduct of the
business of insurance, and the Court's judgment would not preclude any insurance
company from offering annuity benefits on the basis of sex-segregated actuarial tables, all
that was at issue in Norris was an employment practice.288 The McCarran-Ferguson Act
was inapplicable to the Arizona plan, the Court held, because the case involved a chal-
lenge to an employer, rather than an insurance company,'" Accordingly, the Court
determined that it did not need to decide whether Title VII specifically related to the
business of insurance within the meaning of the Act. 207
The Court concluded that Arizona could not disclaim responsibility for discrimina-
tory features of the insurer's options when the state specifically selected which insurance
company would participate in the pension plan.'" In holding that Arizona violated Title
VII regardless of whether third parties were also involved in the discrimination,'" the
Court determined that "employers are ultimately responsible" 210 for the fringe benefit
schemes they adopt under Title VII's "compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of
employment" clause." The Court then moved directly to a discussion of the third part of
its analysis and considered whether retroactive relief was appropriate to compensate the
plaintiff for the Title VII violation.
In the final section of the Norris Court's analysis, Justice Marshall stated that retroac-
tive relief should be granted to the employees because Norris "was clearly foreshadowed
by Manhart." 2 " The Court opined that the Manhart Court had not awarded refunds to
female employees for excessive past contributions because before that decision, no prece-
dent existed on the pension plan issue ." 8 According to the Norris opinion, the Man,hart
Court had noted that the administrators of the pension plans had acted conscientiously
and intelligently and had believed that their programs were lawful.'" In the Norris Court's
view, these good faith actions were enough to deny a retroactive remedy to Manhart
employees. 215 The Manhart decision, the Court stated, should have put Arizona on notice
that paying unequal monthly benefits in a pension plan was a Title VII violation. 218 To
support this conclusion, the Court cited Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 2 " a 1975 decision
emphasizing that a central purpose of Title VII was to compensate persons who are
injured because of employment discrimination. 2 ' 8
2°a
2°5 Id.
"0 Id. The Court stated that the applicability of Title VII to Norris did not supersede any state
taw governing the business of insurance because "Arizona plainly is not itself involved in the business
of insurance, since it has not underwritten any risks." Id.
2°2 Id.
208 Id, at 3501.
209 Id.
21° Id.
211 Id.
2 " Id. at 3503.
212 Id. at 3502-05.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216
	 at 3503.
217 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
216 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3502 (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418).
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Although Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority opinion on the merits of the
case,'" she disagreed with Justice Marshall on the retroactivity issue."" Specifically,
Justice O'Connor questioned whether the Manhart decision had clearly foreshadowed the
Norris finding that defined-contribution plans were as violative of Title VII as defined-
benefit plans."' According to Justice O'Connor, sufficient uncertainty existed as to Man-
hart's precedential value, making retroactive relief inappropriate."' In addition, Justice
O'Connor stated that the economically inequitable results imposed by a retroactive appli-
cation of the Court's holding also compelled a prospective remedy.'" Justice O'Connor,
therefore, held that retroactive relief was inappropriate."'
Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion in Norris and was joined by three other
justices.'" The dissent began its analysis by suggesting that the Norris decision was
contrary to the Manhart Court's restrictive statement that Title VII "was [not] intended to
revolutionize the insurance and pension industries."' According to the dissent, the
majority's opinion would force employers to discontinue annuity plans and cause disrup-
tive changes in long-established methods of calculating insurance and pension plans.'"
Moreover, the dissent noted that the high costs of equalizing benefits for men and women
would be passed on to the annuity beneficiaries and to the public."
The dissent then discussed the terms of the Arizona plan at issue and the relative
advantages of the life annuity option of that plan." The Court's view, the dissent
maintained, left an employer wishing to provide the favored annuity option to its employ-
ees with just three choices that satisfy a strict Title VII analysis. 2'0 First, an employer could
provide the unisex annuities itself, without using independent insurance companies to
manage the policies."' This option, according to the dissent, would be both too expensive
to operate and too difficult to administer for an employer to accomplish alone."' Second,
215 Id. at 3510-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Addressing Congress' intent in constructing Title
VII, Justice O'Connor examined Manhart's focus on the language, structure, and legislative history of
Title VII. Id. at 3511 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor asserted that the Norris decision
ignored any potential impact on all insurance plans, including individual purchases of all insurance,
because Title VII only applies to employment, not independent insurance companies. Id. Justice
O'Connor agreed with the majority that the pension plan offered was a privilege of employment,
making the plan itself employment related. Id.
120 Id. at 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221 Id,
222 Id.
225 Id. Justice O'Connor relied on the Supreme Court decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, which "set forth three criteria for determining when to apply a decision of statutory
interpretation prospectively. First, the decision must establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed . . . [S]econd, ... whether retroactivity will further or retard the operation of
the statute . [and] third ... whether retroactive application would impose inequitable results . . ."
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2" Id. at 3493.
225 Id. at 3504 (Powell, J., dissenting). See supra note 67.
226 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717).
"' Id. at 3504 (Powell, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 3504-05 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting).
250 
" 1 Id.
252 Id. at 3505-06 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the employer could choose to contract with companies using only unisex tables.'" In the
dissent's view, this option would be difficult to implement, however, because most insur-
ance companies use sex-based tables because state law prevents unisex tables or because
unisex tables are found to be unsound actuarially."' Third, the employer could elect not
to provide the advantageous life annuity option at all.'" According to the dissent, this
third option was precisely what happened in the Norris case when the state of Arizona
discontinued making life annuities available to its employees.'" The dissent explained
that any employee of Arizona who now wished to have the security provided by a life
annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings, pay income tax on that
amount, and then use the remainder to purchase an annuity at rates that will be sex-based
on the open market.'" The Norris dissent indicated that none of the choices remaining
open to the employer were likely to benefit the employee. 238
 First, stated the dissent, since
employers will avoid higher costs of unprohibited options by not offering attractive
annuity plans, employees will be denied the opportunity to buy lifetime annuities at a
lower cost.'" Second, if employers do choose to offer the plans, the dissent asserted that
the heavy costs of equalizing benefits will probably be passed on to current employees. 244
The dissent suggested that such a sweeping change in insurance practices was surely not
intended either by the Court's decision in Manhart or by Congress' enactment of Title
After criticizing the Norris Court's effect on employees, the Norris dissent turned to a
consideration of Title VD's legislative history and the policies underlying that statute.
This examination, the Court stated, demonstrated that Title VD's policies were inappli-
cable to the insurance industry.'" According to the dissent, the Manhart Court had been
careful to limit its holding to the precise issue before it, unequal employer contributions to
an employer-operated pension fund. 243 The dissent asserted that its conclusion that
Congress intended that Title VII have a narrow reach was supported by the existence of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, adopted by Congress in 1945.244 Under that legislation, the
regulation of the insurance industry was presumptively committed to the states. 245 The
statute provided that, unless a congressional act "specifically relates to the business of
insurance," no act by Congress should be construed to supersede state laws regulating the
insurance industry.246
 According to the dissent, the Norris majority was wrong to assert
that, because Title VII applies only to employers, it did not affect the business of
insurance.'" This interpretation of Title VII, in the dissent's view, would prohibit em-
ployers from purchasing any annuities for their employees."' The dissent explained that
233 Id. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 3506 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2" Id.
236 Id. at 3506 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
237
238 Id.
'39 Id.
24e Id. at 3506 (Powell, J., dissenting).
247
292 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 3507 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
244 Id.
247 Id. at 3507 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
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most states, including Arizona, allow employers to purchase sex-based annuities for their
employees 249
 Those states, the dissent asserted, have determined that the use of sex-
based mortality tables comports with state-proscribed definitions of employment dis-
crimination and is not unfair discrimination between individuals.'" The dissent stated
that the majority offered no satisfactory reason for concluding that Congress intended
Title VII to preempt the state regulation of the insurance industry." Under the majority
holding, the dissent reasoned, Title VII is a federal law denying employers the right to do
what state insurance law allows, thereby invalidating or superseding that state law.'" The
dissent argued that the commands of the McCarran-Ferguson Act were "directly rele-
vant" to interpreting Congress' intent in enacting Title VII. 233
 Accordingly, the dissent
concluded that the applicability of that legislation compelled the narrow reading of Title
VII adopted by the Supreme Court in Manhart . 2"
Following its discussion of the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the
dissent examined further legislative history of Title VII. 233
 The dissent considered
Senator Humphrey's remarks on the Senate floor during the debate on the Civil Rights
Act.'" Specifically, the dissent looked to Humphrey's statement that it was "unmistakably
clear" that Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and women under
industrial benefit plans.'" The dissent interpreted this statement as demonstrating that
Congress perceived Title VII to "have little, if any, impact on existing pension plans."'"
Although the Manhart Court had stated that this statement was not sufficient to preclude
the application of Title VII to an employer-operated plan,'" the Norris dissent asserted
that. Humphrey's statement provided strong support for Manhart's assertion that Con-
gress intended Title VII to have only an indirect effect on the private insurance indus-
try:26" According to the dissent, Title VII would not, therefore, be applicable to insurer-
operated pension plans.26 ' The dissent concluded that neither the language of the statute
nor its legislative history supported the Norris majority's holding that Arizona, as an
employer, had violated Title V11. 26'
Next, the dissenting opinion stated that the policy set forth in Title VII was to
proscribe discrimination in employment practices. 263
 According to the dissent, Title VII's
specific focus on the individual had little relevance to the business of insurance, because
"9 Id.
25u
	
The dissent noted that, "most state laws regulating insurance and annuities explicitly
proscribe 'unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Id. (citing Bailey, Hutchinson &
Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 783 (1976)). The
dissent went on to say, "Arizona insurance law similarly provides that there should be 'no unfair
discrimination between individuals of the same class."' Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3507 n.6 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)(citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (1983)).
n' Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3507 (Powell, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 3507 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Z" Id.
2" Id. at 3506-08 (Powell, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 3508-09 (Powell; J., dissenting).
25g Id. at 3508 (Powell, J., dissenting).
257
"8 Id. at 3508 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 714). See supra note 102 for
a discussion of how the Manhart Court dealt with this argument.
25" Manhart, 435 U.S. at 714.
2" Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3508 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2111 Id.
265 Id.
2113 Id.
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the basic mechanics of insurance and annuities involve determinations of the life expec-
tancies of identifiable groups, rather than determinations of how long any one individual
will live!" The dissent determined that although the Norris Court held Arizona responsi-
ble for unlawful discrimination, the Court actually condemned the entire insurance
industry's use of sex-based classification. 265 The Norris dissent asserted that none of the
policy considerations underlying the enactment of Title VII suggested that Congress, by
adopting that legislation, intended to reach the independent insurance industry. 2" Ac-
cording to the dissent, the basic purpose behind Title VII, to eradicate employment
discrimination, implies that the statute is directed against discrimination, or "disparate
treatment . . . that intentionally or arbitrarily affects an individual." 267 Because life
expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that demonstrably differentiates females from
males and that is not measurable on an individual basis," 269 the dissent found nothing
arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory about recognizing the objective actuarial disparity
in sex-based mortality tables. 209 According to the dissent, therefore, the Norris majority
was wrong to invalidate the long-approved insurance practice of using sex-distinct tables
"on the basis of its own policy judgment." 27°
Finally, the dissent discussed the availability of retroactive relief. 2" The dissent's
reasons for not granting retroactive relief were similar to Justice O'Connor's argument
against that remedy outlined in her concurring opinion. 272 The dissent noted that, like the
employer in Manhart, Arizona may well have assumed that its pension plans were law-
11.11. 273 In addition, the dissent recognized that a retroactive remedy would not only
disrupt the operation of an employer's pension plan, but because reserves normally are
sufficient to cover only the cost of funding and administering the plan, the insurer's
solvency and the insured's benefits would also be jeopardized. 2" Accordingly, the dissen-
2"4 Id. The dissent noted that:
The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts the rate of mortality depends
on its ability to identify groups with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities
thus requires that an insurance company group individuals according to attributes that
have a significant correlation with mortality . . . Instead of identifying all relevant
attributes, most insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria that
provide both an accurate and efficient measure of longevity, including a person's age
and sex. These particular criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable.
Id. at 3509 (Powell, J., dissenting).
vis id.
266 Id.
"7 Id.
2"' Id. (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 724 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)).
269 Id. Justice Powell noted: "Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based
on unisex mortality tables, men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits than similarly situated
women." Id. at 3509 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2Th Id. at 3509 (Powell, J., dissenting).
27' Id. at 3509-10 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in the final section of the
dissenting opinion which resulted in a plurality diiapproval of retroactive relief as both "unprece-
dential and manifestly unjust." Id.
272 See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
27.1
	
103 S. Ct. at 3510 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that given the explicit
limitation in Manhart confirming that an employer could set aside equal contributions and let each
retiree purchase whatever benefit his or her contribution could command on the open market,
Arizona "reasonably could have assumed that it would be lawful to make available to its employees
annuities offered by insurance companies on the open market." Id.
274 Id. Justice Powell stated that "the cost of complying with the District Court's award of
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Lets, along with Justice O'Connor, constituted a majority of the Norris Court, holding that
even if Arizona had violated Title VII, the employer's liability for a violation in pension
plans such as Arizona's should be prospective only."5
III. THE WEAKNESSES IN THE SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS IN NORRIS
InNorris, the Court held that Arizona had violated Title VII by discriminating against
women in an employment setting. 276
 The Court determined that where an employer
offered an annuity option to employees participating in a pension plan, and the annuities
were calculated and disbursed by a private insurer based on sex-distinct mortality tables,
the employer violated Title VII by providing unequal benefits to men and women."' In
holding that Title VII's focus on the individual prohibited an employer, even indirectly,
from using group characteristics to distribute annuities, the Norris Court relied on the
Manhart opinion.2" This section of the casenote will demonstrate that the Court reached
this conclusion due to three errors in judgment. First, the Court implied that an agency
relationship existed between Arizona and the insurance companies using the sex-based
actuarial tables.279 The Court made this implication even though the state had little
control over either the administration of annuities or the conditions in the marketplace
causing women to receive smaller periodic payments. 28° Second, the Court determined
that the state was liable even though Arizona's annuity plan gave employees an option of
whether or not to participate."' The greater freedom of choice offered to Arizona's
employees was a critical difference between that pension plan and other litigated pension
cases relied on by the Norris Court."' Third, the Court disregarded Norris' failure to
prove that Arizona had intended to discriminate against female employees. 283 Previous
Supreme Court decisions have established that discriminatory intent must be shown to
state a successful Title VII complaint."' It will be submitted that the weaknesses in the
Norris Court's analysis enabled the Court to use Title VII as a crutch to reach the allegedly
wrongful acts of private insurers. In effect, the Court has extended Title VII beyond its
intended scope, the regulation of activities of employers, and into the regulation of
private industry.
A. Arizona's Lack of Control Over the Independent
Insurers and the Marketplace
The Norris Court held that Arizona was responsible for the "discriminatory" actions
of private insurance companies. 285
 To reach this holding, the Court was forced to impute
retroactive relief would range from $817 to $1260 million annually for the next 15 to 30 years."Id.
These figures assume that employers would be required to "top up" women's benefits to allocate
resources between men and women. Id. at 3510 nil (Powell, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 3510 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell agreed with Justice O'Connor that "only
benefits derived from contributions collected after the effective date of the judgment need be
calculated without regard to the sex of the employee." Id. at 3510 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
n Id. at 3499.
"7 Id.
"E' Id.
278 See infra text accompanying notes 289-306.
"° See infra text accompanying notes 298 and 307-28.
261
 See infra text accompanying notes 329-50.
'" See infra text accompanying notes 329
-50.
2" See infra text accompanying notes 351
- 77.
ul See infra text accompanying notes 351-77.
255 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501.
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the allegedly wrongful acts of the insurers to the state, because Title VII's broad policy
prohibiting sex discrimination in the employment sphere only applies to the relationship
between employer and employee.'" Although the Court perceived the use of sex-based
mortality tables by private insurers as a discriminatory practice, it was unable to attack that
practice directly because Norris' claim of a Title VII violation was brought against her
employer, Arizona."' Instead, the Court used Title VII to define the use of actuarial
tables as employment discrimination by claiming that Arizona's "affirmative action" in
offering the pension plan was enough to constitute control over the plan's discriminatory
features 289
The Norris majority misapplied Title VII to fix liability for an alleged discriminatory
act. In the court of appeals' opinion in Norris, the Ninth Circuit cited Manhart for the
proposition that an employer cannot avoid his responsibilities by delegating discrimina-
tory programs to corporate shells," because Title VII applies to any agent of a covered
employee.'" The Supreme Court, in deciding Norris, adopted this agency argument by
holding Arizona, as the employer, "ultimately responsible" for the privileges it provided
to state employees.'" Although it was actually the use of sex-based mortality tables that
the Court found offensive, the Court held Arizona responsible under Title VII. To reach
this conclusion, the Norris majority must have presumed that Arizona had attempted to
delegate its discriminatory programs to a corporate shell, the insurance company, in an
attempt to pass on the responsibility for discriminatory actions to a better-protected
corporate entity. Norris failed to argue in her complaint, however, that the independent
insurance carriers selected by Arizona were either corporate shells or agents of the
state."' Although the discriminatory features of the insurers' annuity programs were
entirely within the control of those insurance companies, the Norris Court emphasized in a
footnote that Title VII applies to "any agent of an employer."'" The Court's statement in
that footnote, with no further explanation, suggests that the Norris majority considered
the insurers to be agents of Arizona. Similarly, the Court's characterization of the rela-
tionship between the insurer and employer as a contractual one 293
 rather than the more
realistic interpretation that the annuity contract was made between the employee and the
insurer, also implies that the Court assumed that an agency relationship existed between
Arizona and the insurers. The Court's use of agency principles is totally inconsistent with
the essence of the principal-agency relationship, the principal's power to control the
activities of the agent."' In any agency relationship, the principal consents to have an
agent act on his behalf and subject to his control, and the agent consents to do so.295 The
right of control by the principal may be exercised by prescribing what the agent shall or
shall not do before the agent acts, or at the time he acts, or at both times.'" A relationship
in which one acts for the benefit of another, however, does not inherently contain the
requisite element of control."'
2" Id. at 3499 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718 n.33).
"7 See supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
' 103 S. Ct. at 3501. See supra text accompanying note 195.
2"9 Norris, 671 F.2d at 334 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718 n.33).
220 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501.
291 Petitioner's Brief at 12.
292 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3499 n.16.
293
 Id. at 3501.
294 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 2(1) ( 1933).
295 Id.
"I' Id. at § 14 comment a.
291 Id. at § 14 comment e.
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In Norris, the plaintiffs made no showing that Arizona exercised control over inde-
pendent insurance companies 2 98 Arizona could not control the companies' use of sex-
based actuarial tables. The state's inability to determine the provisions of the benefit plans
was illustrated by a showing in the record that the state was unaware of any private
insurance company in Arizona offering an annuity plan that did not calculate benefits
according to sex-specific tables."" Furthermore, Arizona was required to comply with a
number of specific provisions in a state statute to obtain group policies for its employees at
all.`U1 This "licensing" requirement also reduced Arizona's control over the acts of insur-
ers.
Other courts have recognized that employers do not control every party whose
actions benefit the employee. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in Peters v. Wayne State
University, in holding that the university had not violated Title VII when its insurer used
sex-based tables to calculate annuities, asserted that TIAA was not an agent of the
university."' The court recognized that since Wayne State did not have control over
either the insurer's calculation of benefits or disbursement of unequal payments to
employees, no agency,relationship existed between the two parties and, therefore, TIAA
was not an employer for purposes of Title VII." 2 Similarly, in General Building Contractors
Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,'" the Supreme Court held that a union operating a discrimina-
tory hiring hall, created through an agreement with the employers' trade associations, was
riot the agent of the associations or the employers." 4 The Court stated that no agency
relationship existed because the employers did not have the right to control the physical
activities of the union, nor was the employers' power to oppose the union tantamount to
the right to control it.205 In Norris, the state did not control the insurance companies'
calculation of annuities. The employer only wished to offer its employees a highly
attractive pension option, but each insurer that submitted a bid for Arizona's policy used
sex-based mortality tables."" The Norris Court should have recognized that the control
element, necessary for a finding of an agency relationship between Arizona and the
independent insurer, was missing and thus precluded the assumption that the insurer was
an agent to whom Arizona had delegated its discriminatory actions.
Arizona's lack of control over its annuity plan is demonstrated not just by the absence
of an insurer pool using unisex tables, but also by its inability to affect conditions in the
marketplace." 7 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have held that a defendant will
not be found to have discriminated against women because of conditions or obstacles
existing in the marketplace not created by the defendant and over which the defendant
has no control."" For example, in 1980, in Harris v. McRae,'" the Court held that, while
the state itself may not impose obstacles in the exercise of a woman's freedom to choose to
have an abortion, it need not remove those obstacles not of its own creation, such as
'1" Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13.
293
 Id. at 6.
'll* ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., v.7 § 20-1252 (1975).
"" 1
 Peters, 691 F.2d at 238.
202 Id.
'"' 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
'14
 ld. at 392- 93.
'3"' Id. at 393. See Petitioner's Brief at 12 (citing General Building Contractors, 73 L.Ed 2d at 851).
"("' Petitioner's Brief at 12.
"7 See infra text accompanying notes 324-28.
3" See infra text accompanying notes 309-23.
3D9
 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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indigency, by providing funding for an abortion for women unable to pay themselves."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that an employer has no obligation to provide
additional compensation to women because of conditions the employer could not
change."' In Nashville Gas Co. v. Salty,'" the Court recognized that, although Title VII
prohibited employers from placing a burden on female employees because of their
differing biological role in life," they are not required under Title VII to provide greater
economic benefits, such as sick pay for pregnant employees, to one sex over the other
because of those differing biological roles. 314 Although Congress recently amended Title
VII to require employers to provide disability benefits for pregnant employees,' the
Court's reasoning in these decisions remains significant. Both the McRae and Nashville Gas
Courts distinguished between the imposition of burdens or obstacles specifically caused by
an employer which discriminated against a group, and an employer's mere failure to take
affirmative action to eliminate discrimination not of its own making." Only the first
scenario constituted a violation of Title VII.
Based on the reasoning of the McRae and Nashville Gas decisions, the Norris Court
should not have found a Title VII violation. In Norris, Arizona did not impose any
burdens or place any obstacles in the way of its female employees. Contributions for
similarly situated employees were equal and the actuarial value of their deferred compen-
sation at the payout stage of the plan was the same. The mere failure of the state to
provide additional compensation for females to make up for the smaller periodic pay-
ments received from the insurer-operated plan should not have constituted sex discrimi-
nation by Arizona. As the Supreme Court stated in Nashville Gas, Title VII does not
require the employer to pay the "incremental amount" necessary for a female to obtain as
full a benefit as her male counterpart in the open market.' Moreover, other lower courts
deciding Title VII cases have applied this general reasoning that employers are not
responsible for curing market inequality for men and women." For instance, in 1982, in
Briggs v. City of Madison,'" the United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin ruled that, under Title VII, an employer's liability extends only to its own acts
of discrimination. 3" In Briggs, women employees claimed that the defendant city had
violated Title VII by upgrading the pay ranges of the all-male public health sanitarians
while not raising the pay of public health nurses. 321 The district court rejected this
contention, stating that for the employer to pay the wage rates necessary to compete in the
marketplace for qualified job applicants was not improper. 322 The court concluded that
310 Id. at 316.
3" See infra text accompanying notes 317-23.
3'2
	
U.S. 136 (1977).
313 The differing biological role at issue in Satty was women's ability to bear children. Id. at 138.
a" Id. at 143.
a" In 1976, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U.S.C.
2000e (k) (1982). See supra note 178,
3" See supra text accompanying notes 308-14.
ail 435 U.S. 136 (1977). See Petitioner's Brief at 20.
a" E.g., Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977); Barone v. Hackett, 28
FEP Cases 1765, 1770 (D. R.I. 1982); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Western Airlines, Inc., 23 FEP
Cases 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
319 Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
"° Id. at 447.
321 Id. at 440.
322 Id. at 449.
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nothing in Title VII indicates that an employer's liability extends to conditions of the
marketplace it did not create.'"
The Norris Court erred in holding Arizona liable under Title VII for practices in the
marketplace over which it had no contro1.324
 The deferred compensation plan offered by
Arizona falls squarely within the open-market exception created by the Supreme Court in
Manhart. Under that exception, an employer may set aside equal retirement contributions
for each of its employees and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit his or her
accumulated contributions could command in the open market without violating Title
VII.325 Arizona's pension plan comes under the open-market exception in two ways. First,
the pension plan allows employees to select a lump-sum payment upon retirement 32° so
that they can purchase the largest benefits possible in the open market. Second, even if an
employee does not choose to exercise the right to receive the lump-sum payment, the life
annuities offered by the insurance carriers exactly reflect the annuity plans available in
the open market. As the Norris dissent noted, a female employee who did choose the
lump-sum payment and then desired to purchase an annuity plan on her own from an
independent insurer would still be subject to sex-based mortality tables."' The employee
would not, therefore, be purchasing any greater benefit on the open market than she
could through Arizona's plan. The Norris majority was wrong to conclude that Arizona's
deferred compensation plan did not fit under the open-market exception simply because
Arizona had "affirmatively" offered a benefit favoring men. If Arizona's plan did not
meet the plain language of the Manhart exception, it is difficult to imagine how any
pension plan offering annuities ever will. As the Norris dissent pointed out, the Court's
holding implies that the open-market exception can only be fulfilled if an employer
subjects its employees to the harsh tax consequences of receiving their contributions in a
lump-sum payment which reduced amount is then used to purchase benefits on the open
market. 328 Nothing in the Manhart opinion suggested that meeting such a requirement
was necessary in order to fall under the open-market exception. In effect, the harsh result
imposed by the Norris Court's decision disregards the policies expressed in Manhart that
Title VII was not intended to revolutionize the insurance industry.
B. Freedom of Choice as a Factor in Determining the State's Liability
The Norris Court not only failed to demonstrate how the agency requirement of
control was present in the Arizona-insurer relationship, but the Court also neglected to
recognize the importance of the Arizona employees' freedom to choose different pension
options in determining the state's liability. The Court was wrong to apply the Supreme
Court analysis in Manhart to Arizona's deferred compensation plan because in Manhart,
no private insurance company was involved in the administration of benefits."' In
3" Id.
3" See supra notes 307-23 and accompanying text.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18.
"" Norris, 103 S. CL at 3494.
227 Id. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting). justice Powell stated that °[t]he companies that underwrite
the life annuities, as do the vast majority of private insurance companies in the United States, use
sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Arizona's [annuity option] is to allow its employees
to purchase at a tax saving the same annuities they would otherwise purchase on the open market."
Id.
325 See id. at 3506 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
32  Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705.
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Manhart, the employer not only exercised complete control over all aspects of the pension
fund but also required its employees to participate in the plan."' Arizona's deferred
compensation plan was readily distinguishable from the pension plan considered in
Manhart because the state relinquished nearly all control of the annuities aspect of its
pension plan to private insurers."' While in other post-Manhart pension cases finding
Title VII violations, such as Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 3'2 and EEOC
v. Colby College , 333 the employers' annuity plans were mandatory for all employees,
Arizona employees were not required to participate in the "discriminatory" annuity
plan.'" The Arizona employees were also given three different options to choose from in
their retirement plans: the annuities, the periodic payments, and the lump-sum plan. The
Spins employees, however, entered into an annuity plan automatically upon employment
with Long Island University. 335 Thus, Arizona employees were given considerable free-
dom to choose what type of plan, if any, they wished to participate in through their
employer.
When a woman employee of Arizona reached the age of retirement, she was free to
choose the alternative best suited to her needs.'331 If she were in good health, she was free
to gamble, just-as any individual man was, by taking the life annuity contract, hoping that
she would live beyond the actuarial date set by the tables. If the female employee
succeeded and lived beyond this date, she would probably have received more compensa-
tion from the state than most similarly situated males. I f, on the other hand, an individual
woman were in poor health or felt that it was likely that she would die before the actuarial
age calculated for women, she was free to choose, even following retirement, the lump-
sum plan and, thus, take all her accumulated assets from the pension fund at the
beginning of her retirement.
In a brief footnote, the Norris majority rejected the state's argument that Arizona's
decision to offer two other pension plan options, both provided on equal terms to men
and women, relieved the state of liability.'" Relying on a footnote from the Supreme
Court's decision in 1982, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,338
 the Court dis-
3" Manhart, 553 F.2d at 583.
North, 103 S. Ct. at 3494-95.
691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982). See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
' 1" 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978). See supra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"' Spirt, 475 F. Supp. at 1300.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3494.
337 Id. at 3497 n.10. The Court stated: "An employer that offers one fringe benefit on a
discriminatory basis cannot escape liability because he also offers other benefits on a nondiscriminat-
ory basis." Id.
an Id. The Norris Court cited Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24
n.8 (1982). The footnote relied on from that case stated:
Without question, MUW's admissions policy worked to Hogan's disadvantage. Al-
though Hogan could have attended classes and received credit in one of Mississippi's
state-supported coeducational nursing programs, none of which was located in Colum-
bus, he could attend only by driving a considerable distance from his home. A similarly
situated female would not have been required to choose between foregoing credit and
bearing that inconvenience. Moreover, since many students enrolled in the School of
Nursing hold full-time jobs, ... Hogan's female colleagues had available an opportu-
nity, not open to Hogan, to obtain credit for additional training. The policy of denying
males the right to obtain credit toward a baccalaureate degree thus imposed upon
Hogan "a burden he would not bear were he female."
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 n.8 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979)).
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missed Arizona's contention that the greater freedom of choice offered by the state could
be a critical difference in determining liability. 339 The Hogan Court held that a state
statute excluding males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing school
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'" The Norris ma-
jority's reliance on Hogan, however, was misplaced. In the Hogan footnote the Court
stated that the other options available to plaintiff Hogan, such as attendance at another of
Mississippi's state-supported, co-educational nursing programs, did not alleviate the dis-
advantages that he had suffered when he was denied admission to an all-female school."'
Presumably, the Norris majority likened the situation in Hogan to the fringe benefit
scheme offered by Arizona and concluded that a female employee was still disadvantaged
by the annuity plan, even if she had the choice of two other plans offered on an equal
basis. In making this analogy, the Norris Court ignored the major premise behind the
Hogan footnote. Justice O'Connor, who wrote the decision for the majority of the Hogan
Court, acknowledged in the footnote several facts specific to the Hogan plaintiff's com-
plaint."' For instance, Justice O'Connor recognized that Hogan was considerably incon-
venienced because the school to which he was denied admission was in his hometown.343
According to Justice O'Connor, Hogan would have had to travel long distances to attend
other state-supported nursing schools in that state. 344 The Hogan Court ultimately held, in
a five-to-four decision, that Hogan was denied equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment.'" In the dissent to Hogan, Justice Powell criticized the Hogan majority's
characterization of Hogan's injury as one of "inconvenience" and expressed embarrass-
ment at the "constitutional right to attend a state-supported university in one's
hometown" proposed by a majority of the Court in Hogan.'"
The Norris Court's reliance on a controversial footnote is tenuous. First, the issue in
Hogan was educational discrimination under an equal protection analysis, 347 while the
Norris case involved a Title VII violation of employment discrimination."' In prohibiting
calculations based on group characteristics in employer pension plans, the Norris Court
relied on statutory interpretation to assert that the focus of Title VII is on the individual.
In dismissing Arizona's contention that its freedom of choice plan was critical in determin-
ing liability, however, the Court cited, in a footnote, the Hogan footnote, which was from a
case decided on constitutional equal protection grounds. The authority relied on by the
Norris Court to dismiss Arizona's option argument as "irrelevant"349 was itself misplaced.
Justice O'Connor's purpose in writing the Hogan footnote was to illustrate that the
school's denial of admission to Hogan subjected the challenged policy to scrutiny under
331
' Petitioner's Brief at 16. Petitioner Arizona relied on Chief Judge Coffin's concurring opinion
in Colby College to support its freedom of choice argument. Id. (citing Colby College, 589 F.2d at 1146
(Coffin, C. J., dissenting)).
"" Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733.
3" Id. at 723-24 n.8.
342 See supra note 338.
343 See supra note 338.
3" See supra note 338.
343 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733.
34e
	
at 736 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell asserted that the "heightened equal protec-
tion standard" used by the majority frustrates the liberating spirit of the clause. Id. at 741 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
341 Id. at 733.
34' Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501.
3" Id, at 3497 n.10.
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the equal protection clause, even though the alleged discrimination was against males. 35°
The footnote, therefore, contained facts specific to the issue analyzed in that case. For
instance, Hogan's only other option, if he wished to receive an educational benefit equal
to the benefit denied to him by Mississippi University for Women, was to drive long
distances to other state-supported nursing schools. It is submitted that the Hogan facts are
completely unrelated to the Title VII issue in Norris. Further, the facts detailed in the
Hogan footnote should not have been relied on by the Norris majority to dismiss Arizona's
contention that the options in its plan favorably distinguished it from previously litigated
pension cases where the employer was held liable. The Norris majority overlooked those
critical differences in Arizona's deferred compensation plan and unquestioningly applied
the general Manhart analysis to Norris, just as other post-Manhart decisions, such as spirt
and Colby College, applied Manhart to pension cases without carefully examining the
unique aspects of each plan being considered.
C. Liability Under Title VII Where State Did Not Intend to Discriminate
It is well-settled law that a Title VII plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination before the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate some nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. 35 t A plaintiff must
then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the "legiti-
mate" reasons offered by the defendant were really a pretext for discrimination."" On
numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has held that, when an employee alleges un-
favorable treatment on the basis of sex or race under Title VII, proof of discriminatory
motive is "critical."'S3 For example, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,' the United States instituted a Title VII suit alleging that the Teamsters Union
had engaged in discrimination by hiring only minority workers for less desirable, lower-
paying jobs. 355 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the government had sustained its
burden of showing that the company had engaged in a system-wide pattern of employ-
ment discrimination by purposefully treating minorities less favorably than white ern-
ployees.356 The Teamsters Court emphasized that an allegation of disparate treatment in a
Title VII complaint requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer intentionally dis-
criminated .3" The Supreme Court has reasoned that by imposing the ultimate burden of
350 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723.
351 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. 802 (1973).
"2 Id.
333 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See
also Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Furnco Construc-
tion Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
331 Teamsters, 431 -U.S. 324 (1977).
"' Id. at 329.
a'" Id. at 337.
357 Id. at 335 n.15. The Teamsters Court also noted, however, that discriminatory motive can, in
some situations, be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. Id. (citing Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66). The Court stated: "Undoubt-
edly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII."
Id. Proof of intent is also not required where "the plaintiff claims that a facially neutral employment
policy has a discriminatory impact on protected classes." Id. at 335-36 n.15. The Norris case does not
involve a facially neutral practice since the use of sex-based actuarial tables is not facially neutral. See
Petitioner's Brief at 24 n.14. Plaintiff Norris alleged that she received disparate treatment from
Arizona on account of her sex, and both the Manhart and Norris decisions analyzed the use of
sex-based tables in terms of disparate treatment, not impact. Id. The respondents in their brief
agreed that Norris is a disparate treatment case. Respondent's Brief at 18-24.
118	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:63
proving intentional discrimination on the plaintiff-employee, 358 the Title VII plaintiff's
prima facie case serves an important function in eliminating the most common nondis-
criminatory reasons for the employer's rejection of the plaintiff, such as a job applicant's
lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought."' In Norris, the district
court, in its review of the employee's equal protection claim, expressly found that Arizona
did not intend to discriminate by offering its pension plan to its employees. 368 Because of
this finding, prior Supreme Court cases required that the Norris Court reject, rather than
sustain, the plaintiff's Title VII action.
Despite the Supreme Court's consistent emphasis on the intent requirement in Title
VII cases, the Court in Norris adopted the court of appeals' rejection of the intent
requirernent.'"" The appeals court had reasoned that Manhart had required no affirma-
tive showing of intent in Title VII pension plan cases, because that Court had not
discussed the issue."' According to the court, Norris did not have to prove intent to
discriminate under Man/tart!'" In the alternative, the court of appeals asserted that
because facially discriminatory practices are intentional for the purposes of Title VII
regardless of the subjective motivation," `° Norris was not required to show Arizona's
discriminatory motive in adopting the annuity plan 3 6`' The presence of an intent to
discriminate could be presumed, the court stated, because the "practices in question"
treat men and women differently. 366 The Supreme Court in Norris did not address the
issue of intent, presumably, because the court of appeals had concluded that proof of
intent was unnecessary. The Court, however, should not have ignored the issue, because
this failure makes determining with which of the lower court's alternative arguments the
Court agreed impossible. If the Court accepted the appeals court's assertion that Manhart
had abolished the intent requirement for pension cases, it is submitted that this reliance
on Manhart is unfounded. Manhart is distinguishable from Norris because, in Manhart, the
employer's intent to discriminate against its employees could fairly be implied from the
structure of the retirement plan. 367 The employer was the controlling party who decided
that women should make larger contributions to the retirement fund. 308 Consequently,
the Manhart Court's failure to address the issue of intent expressly should be viewed
within the context of the facts of that opinion, where the employer's intent to discriminate
was clear. In contrast, Arizona was not responsible for any practices resulting in disparate
treatment of women because the insurers controlled the annuity portion of the pension
plan. Any disparate impact was a result of the use of sex-based actuarial tables by the
private insurance carriers, rather than any action taken by the state.
If the Norris Court's failure to address the intent issue was an acceptance of the
appeals court's alternative theory that facial discrimination satisfies the Title VII intent
requirement, the Court again dealt improperly with the issue. Even if the plan were
facially discriminatory, the Court failed to recognize that the employer must still be the
356 Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253.
359 Teamsters, 431 U.S at 358 n.44.
36,3 Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 651.
361 671 F.2d at 333-34.
362 Id. at 333.
363 Id.
360 Id.
365 Id. at 334.
366 Id.
367 Petitioner's Brief at 25.
366 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705.
December 1984)	 CASENOTES	 119
party performing the discriminatory activity to be liable for that Conduct.369 Arizona did
not calculate and disburse the allegedly sex-discriminatory annuities. In Personnel Adminis-
trator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 3" a case construing the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court stated that discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences."' The Court ruled that the concept of discrimina-
tion implied that the decisionmaker select a particular course of action "because or and
not merely "in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 372 This widely
applied test is applicable to Norris because, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the basic
standard for proving intent in a discrimination claim under the equal protection clause
and in a disparate treatment claim under Title VII is the same.'" In Norris, Arizona's
decision to make lifetime annuities available to its employees as one alternative for
receiving their deferred compensation was not made "because or any alleged adverse
effects on females. Instead, the option was given "in spite of" any such effects, because the
state had no choice but to use sex-based mortality tables as sex-based tables were the only
type used in the private insurance industry."'
The Court's failure to discuss the appeals court's theories of why Norris did not need
to show intent in her Title VII action leaves the issue of the intent requirement in pension
cases unresolved. It is submitted that the Supreme Court erred not only in implicitly
accepting the contention that a showing of intent is unnecessary, by not discussing the
issue, but also in failing to adopt the district court's finding that Arizona did not intend to
discriminate. The district court expressly found that, under the facts of Norris, the
classification providing females with lower benefits was not made by the state but was a
result of the insurers' judgments. 75 The district court noted that under Feeney, Arizona's
inability to affect the use of sex-based tables in calculating annuities was "somewhat less"
than the purposeful discrimination necessary for a finding of a violation."' Accordingly,
under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court's finding of
fact that Arizona was not motivated by any discriminatory intent should not have been set
aside unless clearly erroneous.377 Neither the Norris court of appeals nor the Supreme
Court made a showing that this difficult standard was met. Consequently, the Court
should not have held that Arizona violated Title VII because the district court had found
that there was no intent to discriminate, an essential prerequisite to a Title VII violation.
CONCLUSION
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Norris, Title VII actions brought against
employers requiring their employees to participate in retirement plans, where insurance
companies used sex-based mortality tables to calculate annuities, generally favored the
employee and found employers responsible for discriminatory employment practices.
The Supreme Court in Norris held that an employer violated Title VII by simply offering
3" See Petitioner's Brief at 26.
422 U.S. 256 (1979). See supra note 45.
"' 422 U.S. at 279.
372
373 Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 . n.15. See supra note 357.
374 See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
3" Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 651.
"6 Id.
377 FED. R. Civ, P. 52(a) (1983).
120	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:63
a retirement plan to its employees which included an option to receive benefits in the
form of an annuity. In Norris, the employees could choose among two types of sex-neutral
annuities. Additionally, the employees could choose not to participate in the Arizona
retirement plan at all. Given the flexibility of the Arizona plan, the Court's ruling in Norris
means that even when the most unrestrictive pension annuity plan is offered to employ-
ees, the use of sex-based annuities still violates Title VII and employers are liable for the
discrimination. Even though it had relinquished control over the calculation and dis-
bursement of the annuities to private insurance companies, the employer in Norris was
held responsible. The employer had absolutely no control over the use of sex-based
mortality tables to calculate the annuity payouts and had no realistic opportunity to
change those marketplace practices which treated women differently if it wished to offer
the advantageous annuity option. In holding Arizona liable, the Norris Court relied
extensively on Manha7t but it failed to take notice of the factual differences distinguishing
Arizona's deferred compensation plan and the plan at issue in Manhart . The Court
dismissed the critical freedom of choice factor in the Arizona plan in a superficial footnote
and it completely neglected the absence of discriminatory intent in Arizona's creation of
its pension plan.
The Court's opinion implies that the real wrong commmitted in Norris was the use of
sex-based mortality tables. But the Court erred in holding an employer responsible under
Title VII for the perceived discriminatory practices of private insurers. This underlying
aspect of the decision suggests that a complete restructuring of the insurance industry is
necessary to make men and women equal. The basic principle underlying insurance
policies is an attempt to predict accurately regarding a large group of similar risks, and
the task of equalizing annuity tables would not only be administratively and financially
difficult, but that solution would undermine the purpose of annuities: to distribute the
insured's money so as to last throughout his or her life. Title VII was not intended to
result in the restructuring of insurance industry practices and the statute is ill-equipped to
bring about the major changes suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in Norris.
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